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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I . A Warrantless Search of an Automobile for Weapons Is Not
Justified by the "Public Safety" Exception to the Warrant
Requirement When All of the Suspects Have Been Identified,
Handcuffed and Removed From Close Proximity to the Scene of the
Incident

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In examining a motion to suppress, the appellate court reviews
the trial court's findings of fact "under a 'clearly erroneous'
standard" and the trial court's "ultimate legal conclusions flowing
from these factual findings under a 'correctness' standard." State
v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Bradford,
839 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992); see also State v. Pena 869 P.2d 932
(Utah 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Barlow appeals his conviction for Carrying a Concealed
Dangerous Weapon on the grounds that the police officers illegally
searched a car in which he was a passenger and seized a gun taken
from a fannypack which was located on the floor of the passenger
side of the vehicle.

This search was conducted without a search

warrant and was not conducted pursuant to a valid exception to the
warrant requirement. The state charged Daniel Thomas Barlow in an
amended

information dated February 24, 1994 with Carrying a

Concealed Dangerous Weapon in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10504.

A motion to suppress the gun was filed with the Third Circuit

Court, Murray Department, on February 16, 1994.
2

The Honorable

Mi'-ha^

Burton heard argument on the motion on Mar ::h 22, 2 994.

Th- defense motion to suppress was denied on grounds

that

the

* . . . - vvere authorized to search the vehicle because they were
legitimately concerned for their safety

The trial court ruled

iri.1L t::ie officers did not have authority to search the vehicle
• ••because

"

" except" ion

lannypac.-

holding

the

il

Lhe

Il | if; .'-a riant" re.qni r^inent
yum

w/cit,,.

not

"clearly

incriminating,"
r

Oi l I lar ch
Concealed Dangerous Weapon in violation of Utah Code Ann
504

Th i s was a conditional guilty plea.

pursuant to State v. Serv.
1027 (I INI,-fill C t . A pp
IB

1393).

Mr

:i ng a

§ 76-10-

Barlow reserved his

See also State v. Montova, 858 P. 2d
The Notice of Appeal was filed on July

~ »4.
FACTS

On August 1 5, 1993, Appellant Danie. Todd

Mitchell

(hereinafter

"Mitchell

.,..

witnesse.
reside ce.

Mitchell

(Mitchell driving) jumped into a

-is brother,
•
Barlow

i
and

hereinafter "car

#1 ») and followed the suspect and a passenger (hereinafter "car #2)
1 .< : c " L c i;pa:! lb
Ti

f

)

Cai

-

ex.

Moti on

pulled in, behind car #2,

(hereinafter "M.
Barlow and his brother

confronted the occupants of car #2 about their driving pattern, I I
Tr. 58.
3

At this time, one of the occupants of car #2 ran toward the
apartment buildings and returned with a handgun. Barlow yelled to
some onlookers at the apartment complex to call the police. Id.
Deputies Adamson and Eyre were dispatched to the scene.

Adamson

said "it was dispatched as a fight involving a weapon." M. Tr. 16.
Deputy Eyre also stated that the call was dispatched as "[a] man
with a gun or a fight call."

M. Tr. 29.

Deputy Adamson talked with Barlow when he arrived.

Barlow

told him that one of the persons in car #2 had been waving around
a handgun.

M. Tr. 8.

Deputy Adamson saw "several parties that

were still handcuffed on the ground " in front of the vehicle. M.
Tr. 9, 17.

Barlow was handcuffed as well and the gun had been

taken from the person who had been waving it around.

M. Tr. 16.

All parties involved in the incident were handcuffed and in police
custody.

M. Tr. 17.

Deputy Eyre's version agrees with Deputy

Adamson's--all suspects were handcuffed and in police custody
before the search of the car occurred. At least one individual, if
not more, was lying face down on the parking lot when he arrived.
M. Tr. 37-39.

The gun had been confiscated from the suspect who

was waving it around.

M. Tr. 29-30.

After handcuffing and placing all suspects on the ground,
Deputies Adamson and Eyre searched car #1.

Adamson states the

reason for the search: "[W]e already had a firearm that had been
recovered and we felt for our safety that we needed to make sure
that there were no other firearms involved. And we didn't want to
release the car to anyone until we knew.
4

You know, if we let

someone go sit in a car while we conducted our interview that our
safety wouldn't be in jeopardy if there was another weapon inside
that vehicle."

M. Tr. 13-14.

Eyre said, "I didn't want somebody

getting back in that car without making sure they also didn't have
weapons in it because it was a situation involving guns.

I wanted

to make sure that whoever got back into that car didn't have access
to other weapons.
safety."

And so my main feeling at that time was one of

M. Tr. 32.

The officers recovered a black fannypack from the floor of the
passenger's front seat.

M. Tr. 9, 33.

After picking it up, the

officers noticed that the fannypack had a velcro tear-away pouch
which contained a loaded Smith & Wesson ".38 special". M. Tr. 12,
33-34.

Eventually, Mr. Barlow was charged with Carrying a

Concealed Dangerous Weapon.

Car #1 was released to Todd Mitchell

after the officers had concluded their investigation.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The officers conducted an illegal search and seizure of Daniel
Barlow's fannypack because the officers did not obtain a warrant
before the search nor did the search qualify as an exception to the
warrant requirement.

Specifically, the search did not qualify as

a valid protective

search because all of the suspects were

handcuffed and unable to obtain any possible weapon that was in the
vehicle.

As such, the search was in violation of the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section
14 of the Utah Constitution.
5

ARGUMENT

I. A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE FOR WEAPONS IS NOT
JUSTIFIED BY THE "PROTECTIVE SEARCH" EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT WHEN ALL OF THE SUSPECTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED,
HANDCUFFED AND REMOVED FROM CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE SCENE OF THE
INCIDENT.
The Appellant, Mr. Barlow, does not contest the initial action
of the officers taking him (Barlow) into custody by handcuffing him
and removing him from the scene. However, the subsequent search of
the vehicle for weapons was unreasonable pursuant to Amendment IV
of the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.

"Warrantless seizures and searches are per se

unreasonable unless the exigencies of the situation justify an
exception."

State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983) citing

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576
(1967) .
A.

Immediate Control of Weapons
One such exception allowing a warrantless search is when an

officer "has specific articulable facts which reasonably warrant
the officer to believe that the suspect is dangerous and may gain
immediate control of weapons".

State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979

(Utah App. 1992) citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct.
3469

(1983) .

If this is the case, the officer can search the

suspect and those nearby areas where a weapon may be hidden and a
suspect may gain immediate access to that weapon.
In Strickling, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld a patdown
search of a vehicle's occupants and the subsequent search of the
6

vehicle on the basis that the officer was legitimately concerned
for his safety.

The standard for evaluating this question is

"whether a reasonably prudent man in [these] circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that his safety
Stricklina

. . . was in danger."

844 P.2d at 984, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27,

88 S.Ct. 1868v 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Although
legitimately

the

standard

feared

for

for determining whether an

his

safety

is an

objective

officer

one,

the

officer's subjective intent is a relevant inquiry as well.

Id.

See also State v. Muir. 777 P. 2d 1238 (Idaho App. 1989) .

The

court emphasized the fact that the officer took precautions for his
safety by waiting for backup and taking cover behind a tree before
the situation was stabilized.

In the present case, the officers

claim to be concerned for their safety, yet their actions do not
indicate that concern.

If they were concerned for their safety

from a suspect who was in handcuffs, why weren't Mr. Barlow and the
others frisked prior to the search of the car?

There was no need

to "take cover" or call for backup because the threat had already
been diffused. A reasonable officer in the present situation would
not be reasonably concerned for his or her safety.
dispatched as "[a] man with a gun or a fight call."

The call was
M. Tr. 29.

Before searching the car, the gun had been confiscated from the man
waving it around.

M. Tr. 16.

There was no reason to believe that

more weapons were involved.
The

case

at bar can be distinguished

several respects.

from Stricklina

in

In Stricklina, an officer observed two males
7

exit a Monte Carlo in the alley next to a fraternity house at 1:45
a.m.

The men pressed their faces up to the window of a car parked

in that alley.

When the officer approached them, they fled by

jumping into the Monte Carlo and "peeling out".

The officer had

confronted these individuals earlier in the evening and had reason
to believe that they were not fraternity members. The officer was
also aware of reports of vehicle burglaries in the area earlier
that night.
After stopping the Monte Carlo, the passenger stepped out of
the car, whereupon the officer ordered him back into the car. The
officer called for backup and "took cover" behind a nearby tree.
While waiting for backup, the passenger made a furtive movement by
placing or removing something from underneath his seat.

When

backup arrived, the occupants were ordered to stand at the rear of
the vehicle. While the suspects were standing near the rear of the
Monte Carlo in the company of the backup officer, the original
officer at the scene searched the passenger compartment of the car
and discovered some stereo equipment.
In the present case, the situation was much different.

Any

threat to the officers or the public was completely diffused. All
suspects were handcuffed and in police custody, and at least some
of the suspects were face down on the parking lot pavement. M. Tr.
9, 17. And the gun had been confiscated from the suspect who was
waving it around. M. Tr. 29-30. Unlike the officer in Strickling,
there was no reason for the officers in the case at bar to take
cover or other precautions because the situation was under control.
8

The officers never stated that :hey felt immediate concern for
their safety. Deputy Adamson's only concern was for some possible
future threat: "[W]e already had a firearm that had been recovered
and we felt for our safety that we needed to make sure that there
were no other firearms involved. And we didn't want to release the
car to anyone until we knew. You know, if we let someone go sit in
a car while we conducted our interview that our safety wouldn't be
in jeopardy if there was another weapon inside that vehicle."
Tr. 13-14.

M.

Deputy Eyre expressed the same fear of a future threat

when he stated, "I didn't want somebody getting back in that car
without making sure they also didn't have weapons in it because it
was a situation involving guns. I wanted to make sure that whoever
got back into that car didn't have access to other weapons. And so
my main feeling at that time was one of safety."

M. Tr. 32.

The case law, however, does not justify a search based on a
future threat to officers or the public--the threat must be
immediate.

The officer must be concerned that the suspect is

dangerous and will gain immediate control of a weapon. Stricklincr,
844 at 983 quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. at 3481.
The search must be limited to the "area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon."

Thus, an officer may

search the passenger compartment of a vehicle, but cannot search
the trunk. Id. at 1050, 103 S.Ct. at 3480

(quoting Chime 1 v.

California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685
(1969)).
9

The fact that an officer can only search the passenger
compartment of a vehicle suggests that "immediate control" really
means "immediate threat".
to search the trunk.

Otherwise, an officer would be allowed

A weapon in the trunk is not an immediate

threat because the suspect would need to have his key to open it.
Before getting a weapon out of the trunk, the officer would have
time to respond to the threat.
In the same way, the gun in the fannypack was not in Barlow's
immediate control.
pavement

As he was handcuffed and face down on the

of the parking lot under the watchful eye of many

officers, Barlow was not a threat to anyone. Daniel Barlow had no
access to that fannypack.

Just as an officer may not search the

trunk of a vehicle for weapons, so should he not be allowed to
search the passenger compartment of a vehicle when there is no
threat to the officers' safety.

The safety exception to the

warrant requirement allows for diffusing only immediate threats to
officers' safety.
Also supporting this notion is that the court in Strickling
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's emphasis in Long that a
suspect might "break away from police control and retrieve a weapon
from his automobile".

Strickling 844 P.2d at 984, quoting Long,

463 U.S. at 1052, 103 S.Ct. at 3482.

This may be true in

situations like Strickling where the suspects were standing at the
back of the car, unhandcuffed, in the custody of only one officer
or, in Long where the suspect was about to reenter the vehicle (see
Long facts infra).

In both of these cases, the officers were in
10

immediate danger--the situations had not been stabilized as they
had been in the present case.
In Long, officers observed a car swerve into a ditch in a
rural area.

When the officers went to investigate, they were met

at the rear of the car by the driver who "appeared to be under the
influence of something". As the driver was walking back toward his
car, the officers noticed a hunting knife on the floor of the car.
The driver was stopped and frisked.

Then, while the driver was

detained by one officer, the other searched the vehicle for weapons
and recovered some marijuana. The driver was in the custody of one
police officer during the search, but he was not handcuffed.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the search of the
interior of the car as a valid protective search.

The Court

employed a "balancing test" weighing the reasonableness of the
governmental intrusion against the invasion of a citizen's privacy.
Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 44
Ohio

Ops.2d

383.

In

finding

the

search

constitutionally

permissible, the Court placed great significance on the fact that
a suspect in the defendant's position might "break away from police
control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile."

Strickling,

844 P.2d at 984, quoting Long 463 U.S. at 1052, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1221,
103 S.Ct. at 3482.
In two other Utah cases, the court found that the officers
were justified in conducting a warrantless protective search.
State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Cole,
674 P. 2d 119 (Utah 1983) .

These two cases can be distinguished
11

factually from the present case, however.
was an immediate threat to the officer.

In Bradford, the suspect
The officer stopped a car

in a rural area at 6:24 a.m. for speeding.

There was a .22 caliber

rifle in plain view in the car, and it appeared that the suspect
was "on something."

While the officer was doing a registration

check, the suspect moved a bag toward him from the back of the car.
Unlike Bradford, the present case occurred in the presence of
many officers and the search was conducted after all suspects were
handcuffed and unable to present a threat to the officers.
9, 17.

M. Tr.

In Cole as well as Bradford, the suspect posed an immediate

threat to the officers. The suspect was not in police custody when
officers saw him remove a gun case from the vehicle after being
told that there were no weapons in the vehicle.
B.

State Constitutional Analysis
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:

to

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing
be seized.
It is well established that Utah is free to interpret Article

I, section 14 of its state constitution differently from the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
794 P.2d 460, 465-6

See State v. Larocco,

(Utah 1990); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219

(Utah 1988); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803

(Utah 1896; State v.

Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988); State v. Hvqh, 711
P.2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have acknowledged that
12

federal law under the fourth amendment has become "a labyrinth of
rules

built

upon

a

series

of

contradictory

and

confusing

rationalizations and distinctions" (Hygh, 711 P.2d at 271-2) and
that in certain contexts, a distinct analysis under Article I
section 14 of the Utah constitution may be preferable to a fourth
amendment analysis. Id. see also State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 95
n.7

(Utah App. 1987)

(overruled; id. at 103-5

(Billings, J.,

concurring and dissenting).
In Larocco, 794 P.2d at 465, the majority opinion by the
Supreme Court (J. Stewart clarified that he was not part of the
majority embracing the state constitutional analysis in Larocco)
centered on Article

I, section 14 in the decision that

"an

officer's opening a car door to examine a VIN on a door jam"
constituted an unreasonable search under the state constitution.
The Court recognized that federal fourth amendment law, especially
in the context of automobile searches, "has been a source of much
confusion among judges, lawyers and police." Id. at 466. Although
the court " would hold that a search was conducted within the
meaning of the fourth amendment," it nevertheless reached its
decision under the state constitution.

The Court stated:

The time has come for this court, in applying an automobile
exception to the warrant requirement of article I, section 14
of the Utah Constitution, to try to simplify, if possible, the
search and seizure rules so that they can be more easily
followed by the police and courts and, at the same time,
provide the public with consistent and predictable protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
See also State v. Sims, 808 P.2d
(roadblock

violates

Article

I,
13

141

(Utah Ct. App. 1991)

section

14

of

the

Utah

Constitution); State v. Thompson, 810 P. 2d 415 (Utah 1991) (holding
that bank customers have a right of privacy in bank records under
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution).
Case law from Utah and other jurisdictions supports a distinct
analysis under Article I section 14 where an officer conducts a
protective search of a vehicle for weapons.
As

stated

supra

at

pp.

6-12,

before

upholding

a

valid

protective search of a vehicle, both the Utah Court of Appeals and
the Utah Supreme Court require specific facts which show that an
officer is in immediate danger from a suspect (i.e. lateness of the
hour, rural area, suspect "on something", only one or two officers
present, officer(s) required to take cover, occupants make "furtive
movements" for possible weapon, weapon observed in vehicle by the
officer, and perhaps most importantly, suspect is not handcuffed
and may break away from officers' temporary custody to obtain a
weapon) .

Stricklina 844 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1992); Bradford 839

P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992); Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983).
In Idaho, an officer must express immediate concern for his or
her

safety

conducted.
Muir,

two

before

can

be

State v. Muir, 777 P. 2d 1238 (Idaho App. 1989) .

In

suspects

a

protective

were

under

search

of

surveillance

activity and breaking into vending machines.

a

vehicle

for

illegal

drug

As the two were

seated in a vehicle, three officers approached the car to question
the suspects.

In plain view in the vehicle were jewelers' files

and bolt cutters protruding from under one of the seats.

As the

suspects were being questioned outside of the vehicle, one of the
14

suspects darted toward the open door of the suspects' vehicle. At
this point, the officers conducted a protective search of the
vehicle,

in which

knife as well as the bolt cutters were

recovered.
Important factors for the Idaho Court of Appeals in holding
that the officers were not justified in conducting a protective
search of the car for weapons are: 1) the suspects were not frisked
before search of the vehicle, suggesting that the officers felt no
immediate concern for their safety; and 2) the officers removed any
potential danger posed by the suspects because the suspects were
never allowed to reenter the vehicle. JId. at 1241.
The suspects in the present case, as those in Muir, were never
frisked (frisk of their persons) before the automobile frisk was
conducted. A reasonable officer who was concerned about his safety
would first conduct a patdown frisk of suspects before conducting
a frisk of the vehicle.

The officers were merely conducting a

fishing expedition when they searched the Barlow car--they were not
concerned for their safety.
As to factor (2) above, the officers in the present case also
removed any potential danger posed by the suspects by handcuffing
and placing them face down on the parking lot pavement. M. Tr. 9,
17, 37-39.

As pointed out supra at p. 11,

Strickling

and

Bradford, both Utah cases, relied heavily on the Supreme Court's
emphasis in Long that a suspect might "break away from police
control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile". Stricklinq 844
P.2d at 984, and Bradford, 839 P. 2d 870, quoting Long, 463 U.S. at
15

1052, 103 S.Ct. at 3482.

In both Stricklina and Bradford, the

officers were in immediate danger--the situations had not been
stabilized as they had been in the present case.
Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals, using a state constitutional
rationale, is in agreement with the Idaho Court of Appeals that the
officer must have immediate concern for his or her safety--not some
possible future harm for safety.

In other words, the officer must

be concerned that the suspect is dangerous and will gain immediate
control of a weapon. Stricklina. 844 at 983 quoting Long, 463 U.S.
at 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. at 3481.

For the Utah Court of Appeals

"immediate control" really means "immediate threat". The Appellant
encourages the Court of Appeals to adopt this meaning of immediate
control.
CONCLUSION
The appellant asks the court to find that the search of
appellant's fannypack located in the vehicle without a warrant was
illegal pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution

and

Article

1,

section

14

of

the

Utah

State

Constitution.
SUBMITTED this

| I

day of January, 1995.

Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

76-10-504

CRIMINAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 29.
C.J.S. — 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2.
A.L.R. — What amount to "control" under

state statute making it illegal for felon to have
possession or control of firearm or other dangerous weapon, 66 A.L.R 4th 1240.
Key Numbers. — Weapons *» 2.

76-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon.
(1) Any person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503 and
those persons exempted under Section 76-10-510, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in this Part 5, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor,
except that a firearm that contains no ammunition and is enclosed in a case,
gun box, or securely-tied package shall not be considered a concealed weapon,
but:
(a) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains no ammunition,
he shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(b) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains ammunition, he
shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor; or
(c) If the dangerous weapon is a sawed-off shotgun, or if the dangerous
weapon is a firearm and is used to commit a crime of violence, he shall be
guilty of a felony of the third degree.
(2) Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent any person, except persons described in Section 76-10-503, from keeping within his place of residence, place
of business, or any vehicle under his control any firearm, except that it shall
be a class B misdemeanor to carry a loaded firearm in a vehicle.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-504, enacted by L.
1982, ch. 17, 5 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1982,
ch 17, § 1 repealed former § 76-10-504 (C.
1953, 76*10-504, enacted by 1973, ch. 196,

9 76-10-504), relating to carrying concealed
dangerous weapons, and enacted present
§ 76-10-504.
Cross-References. — Cities may prohibit
carrying concealed weapons, S 10-8-48.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

constitute "carrying*' within the meaning of
this section. State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092

"Carrying."
Lesser included offenses.

(Utah

A ^ r L n will be deemed to be "carrying" a
concealed weapon where such weapon is shown
to be under the person's control and within his
immediate, easy or ready access; it is not required that the weapon be upon one's person to

1981)

Lesser included offenses.
^he offense of carrying a loaded firearm in a
v
f *«*?• « 7610-505, is not a necessarily inci«oed offense of carrying a concealed danger<>U8 weapon. State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092
(Utah 1981).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 8.
C.J.S. — 94 C.J S. Weapons § 3.
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of gun
control laws, 28 A.L.R.3d 845.

Scope and effect of exception, in statute forbidding carrying of weapons, as to person on
hie own premises or at his place of business, 57
A.L.R.3d 938.
Key Numbers. — Weapons *» 6.

328

76-10-505. Carrying loaded firearm in vehicle or on street
Every person who carries a loaded firearm in a vehicle or on any public
street in an incorporated city or in a prohibited area of an unincorporated
territory within this state is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-505, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-505.

Cross-References. — Carrying loaded firearm in vehicle prohibited, 5 23-20-21.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Lesser included offense.
The offense of carrying a loaded firearm in a
vehicle is not a necessarily included offense of

carrying a concealed dangerous weapon,
§ 76-10-504 State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092
(Utah 1981).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 12.

C.J.8. — 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 8.
Key Numbers. — Weapons *» 10.

76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous weapon
in fight or quarrel.
Every person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503, who, not
in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws or
exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-506, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-10-506.

Cross-References. — Aggravated assault,
§ 76-5-103.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Aggravated assault.
Aggravated assault, § 76-5-103, committed
by use of a deadly weapon IB not the same
crime proscribed by this section, and a person
convicted of aggravated assault is not entitled
to receive the misdemeanor penalty provided
by this section, but is to be sentenced under
§ 76-5-103. State v. Verdin, 595 P.2d 862
(Utah 1979). See also Green v. Turner, 409
F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1969) (same conclusion under former law).
Defendant charged with aggravated assault

committed by use .of a deadly weapon,
§ 76-5-103, was entitled to a jury instruction
regarding offense of threatening with a dangerous weapon as a lesser included offense
where two offenses had overlapping elements,
facts of case tended to prove both offenses, and
evidence was subject to an interpretation
which provided both a rational basis for a verdiet acquitting defendant of aggravated assault
charge and convicting him of threatening with
a dangerous weapon. State v. Oldroyd, 685
P.2d 551 (Utah 1984).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 29.
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C.J.8. — 94 CJ.S. Weapons § 16.
Key Numbers. — Weapons •= 14.

